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1A Task-Oriented Heuristic for Repairing Infeasible
Solutions to Overlapping Coalition Structure
Generation
Guofu Zhang, Member, IEEE, Zhaopin Su, Member, IEEE, Miqing Li, Meibin Qi, Jianguo Jiang, and
Xin Yao, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Overlapping coalition formation (OCF), which pro-
vides a natural framework for modeling scenarios where each
agent can join and allocate their resources to several completely
different coalitions at the same time, has become a very active
topic in multi-agent systems (MAS). For OCF in resource-
constrained and subadditive task oriented domains, an agent may
not possess sufficient resources to meet the needs of multiple coali-
tions simultaneously. As a result, there may exist many potential
resource conflicts among the rival overlapping coalitions. To
tackle such situations, we first present a natural variation of the
traditional OCF model and analyze the size of the solution space
and the computational complexity of the overlapping coalition
structure generation (OCSG) problem. Next, we develop a generic
task-oriented heuristic (TOH) for individual repairs that can be
used in binary meta-heuristic algorithms (MHAs) to generate
overlapping coalitions in a parallel manner. Moreover, we show
how the proposed TOH repairs a two-dimensional individual to
resolve resource conflicts and discuss several basic properties.
Finally, to evaluate the effectiveness of TOH, we compare it
with the existing agent-oriented heuristic (AOH) for the OCSG
problem. The empirical results demonstrate that TOH is of high
efficiency and effectiveness in harsh environments with fierce
competition over scarce resources.
Index Terms—Overlapping coalition formation, subadditive
tasks, constrained resources, two-dimensional binary individual,
heuristic.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN multi-agent systems (MAS), agents are computationalentities such as software programs and robots that are able
to accomplish a series of tasks autonomously within a given
time bound [1], [2]. Usually, these agents have some kinds
of abilities or possess a certain amount of resources. When
agents encounter tasks that cannot be fulfilled independently,
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they can share their resources and work together by forming
coalitions [3], [4]. Coalition formation, which is a fundamental
and important form of interaction and cooperation, can make
weak agents strong enough to achieve impossible goals. Then,
the biggest challenges we face are which coalitions will form
and which coalitions are the most beneficial to members’
collaboration and the execution of tasks [5], [6].
In recent years, coalition formation has become a highly
active topic in the field of MAS and has been successfully
applied in operation research and computer science [7]–[9].
However, the traditional coalition formation concentrates on
a very harsh term that each agent can only be a member of
one coalition at any given time [6], which may result in a
very low utilization rate of agents’ resources [10]. In some
practical scenarios, an agent in a complex system has the
characteristic of diversity. That is, the agent can often be
attributed to different categories or goals in which members
are overlapping and interrelated [10], [11]. For example, in
virtual organizations [12], [13] and wireless networks [14],
[15], an agent with sufficient resources is able to apply for
joining several completely different cooperative coalitions to
earn more profits or achieve more objectives. The reason for
this is that overlapping coalitions make it possible for agents to
form a coalition for each task, without preventing other tasks
from being satisfied [10]. Moreover, each agent only needs to
make necessary negotiations and contracts with partners which
actually work together rather than with all the other agents in
the entire system [5]. To model these scenarios, overlapping
coalition formation (OCF) is introduced to allow each agent
to be one member of completely different coalitions and thus
can contribute their resources to the coalitions at the same time
[5], [10].
Additionally, in most of the literature on traditional coalition
formation, it is assumed that there is no resource conflict
in coalition structure generation [6]. That is, each agent’s
resources are unlimited and can fully meet the needs of all
the possible coalitions. Although this assumption is suitable
for some specific scenarios considered in the exiting work,
strictly speaking, each agent’s resources are limited in most
of the practical applications. For example, the finite energy
of each node in wireless sensor networks [16] is the most
valuable resource and directly determines its lifetime, so one
of the most crucial problems is how to schedule and balance
nodes’ energy consumption to conserve energy and increase
the lifetime of the whole network. Another example is the
2distribution of emergency relief supplies in disaster-emergency
management [17]. In this domain, there are numerous reserve
and dispatch points at different locations, and the focus is
on allocating the finite emergency relief supplies of multiple
reserve points to different dispatch points as soon as possible
for maintaining life and improving health. The final example
focuses on multi-camera surveillance systems [18], in which
each camera has limited data processing capability, memory
space, and view angle, and thus each camera can monitor and
recognize few people only within its observation area.
In the above scenarios, when an agent with rare, but highly
demanded resources has joined several completely different
coalitions simultaneously, those coalitions will compete keenly
for this agent. Once the agent is unable to meet the resource
needs of so many coalitions, there may exist potential resource
conflicts over the use of joint resources which are rare, but
in high demand among overlapping coalitions. Then, those
formed coalitions will be unstable and may disband, which
may affect the task execution. This means that when an agent
has limited resources, potential resource conflicts among rival
overlapping coalitions need to be taken into account before
forming coalitions to ensure the reliability and stability of
the entire system [19]. Therefore, each agent in the process
of OCF has to consider the following questions—Which
coalitions will I join? How many resources can I separately
contribute to every coalition that I have joined? Do I have
sufficient resources to meet the requirements of those formed
coalitions at the same time?
On the basis of the preceding considerations, to date, there
have been a number of attempts in the literature to analyze
computational questions surrounding OCF [20]–[23] and find
efficient algorithms for solving OCF to maximize the sum of
the profits for each task, namely, the social welfare [5], [10],
[24]–[27]. Specifically, to avoid the possible resource conflicts
among the competitive overlapping coalitions, Shehory and
Kraus [5], [10], as well as Zhan et al. [27], serially allocated
agents’ resources or weights to form each coalition for the
given tasks, implying that a task’s request can be satisfied only
after the previous coalitions for the corresponding tasks have
been successfully formed. In addition, Zhang et al. [24], [26],
as well as Lin and Hu [25], improved the binary particle swarm
optimization (BPSO) [28] with the two-dimensional encoding
and the corresponding heuristics to search for overlapping
coalitions in a parallel manner. However, the existing work
has the following drawbacks.
 It is not shown theoretically that the embedded heuristics
could strengthen the exploration ability of the search
algorithms;
 The search algorithms would not work, when agents’
resources are not enough to accomplish all the given
tasks;
 The proposed heuristics need to evaluate all the rows and
columns in a two-dimensional binary individual, which
results in that the heuristics are complicated and time-
consuming, especially under the large problem size.
Against this background, this paper makes the following
contributions to the state of the art in OCF:
 We proposed a natural variation of the traditional OCF
in resource-constrained and subadditive task oriented
domains. In the proposed OCF model, each agent’s
resources are limited and the potential resource conflicts
among rival coalitions may take place often.
 We analyzed the size of the search space and the com-
plexity of the key overlapping coalition structure gener-
ation (OCSG) problem in the proposed OCF model. It
was found that the OCSG problem is NP-complete and
the traditional deterministic search techniques may not be
available within an acceptable time.
 We developed a generic task-oriented heuristic (TOH)
for repairing infeasible solutions which can be used in
meta-heuristic algorithms for the OCSG problem. Unlike
the previous work, TOH only repairs each row rather
than all the rows and columns in a two-dimensional
binary encoding. By applying TOH, the binary meta-
heuristic algorithms are able to assign tasks according to
the current residual resources of agents. This is helpful
to make meta-heuristic algorithms workable and available
in a harsh environment where agents have no enough
resources to satisfy all the tasks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II surveys the related work on OCF. Section III proposes
an OCF model in resource-constrained and subadditive task
oriented domains and analyzes the computational complexity
of the key OCSG problem. After discussing the existing AOH
[26] that can be used in binary meta-heuristic algorithms for
solving OCSG, the generic TOH is presented and analyzed
in Section IV. An empirical verification of the proposed TOH
in comparison with AOH is shown in Section V, which is
followed by conclusive remarks and potential directions for
future work in Section VI.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
OCF provides a natural framework for modeling scenarios
where agents can allocate their resources to different coalitions
for the given tasks at the same time. Thus far, much of
the existing work concentrates on studying computational
questions surrounding OCF. Chalkiadakis et al. [20] presented
a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions and
explored the issue of stability in this setting on the basis of the
conservative, refined, and optimistic core. Thereafter, Zick et
al. [21]–[23] proposed an arbitrated OCF model and discussed
its stability according to the arbitrated core. Moreover, Zick
et al. [21], [22] proved that the algorithmic complexity of the
associated problems in the arbitrated OCF crucially depends
on the amount of resources that each agent possesses, the
maximum coalition size, and the pattern of interaction among
agents. However, the above serial work does not show the size
of the solution space and how to search through the solution
space.
A different line of research focuses on algorithms for finding
the optimal overlapping coalition structure to maximize the
sum of the profits for each task [5], [10], [27], which is
also known as the overlapping coalition structure generation
(OCSG) problem. In this regard, Shehory and Kraus [5],
3[10] considered a task-based setting in which coalitions may
overlap and will be successively formed according to the
precedence ordering of each task. Moreover, to reduce the
complexity, they developed greedy algorithms with a specific
limitation on the size of each coalition. However, given such
a limitation, their algorithms cannot find the optimal or even
suboptimal solutions and still need a large amount of memory
requirements and time consumption [29], because of the
repetitive search for each task.
Zhan et al. [27] proved some computational complexity
results of the threshold task games [20], a specific case of OCF
games, and then presented dynamic programming and greedy
algorithms for serial generation of overlapping coalitions.
However, they assumed that the value of a coalition with
responsibility for a given task is known and fixed no matter
which agents will form the coalition. This assumption may
simplify the search algorithm but makes coalition formation
less meaningless in practice. This is because for a task, no
matter which agents form the corresponding coalition and how
members cooperate, it is impossible for members to obtain
more profits. As a result, each member wants itself to become
a freeloader but others to work as much as possible, which
may lead to the non-production or under-production of a public
good, namely, Pareto inefficiency [30].
In addition, the serial generation of overlapping coalitions
for the given tasks [5], [10], [27] also has the following
potential disadvantages. First, once the serial algorithms [5],
[10], [27] cannot find a feasible coalition to satisfy the resource
needs of a task, the algorithms will fall into an infinite loop
and the other unassigned tasks cannot be dealt with, even if
those tasks could have been accomplished by agents. Next,
the previously formed coalitions will inevitably influence the
searching results of coalitions for the successive tasks. The
reason for this is that some agents’ resources have been
kept for the previous coalitions’ own and cannot be used by
the successive tasks. Hence, the final overlapping coalition
structure obtained by the serial algorithms [5], [10], [27]
cannot be optimal and even suboptimal.
In fact, the coalition formation in task-based settings is
just selecting a portion of agents to form coalitions for as
many tasks as possible, which is a complex combinatorial
optimization problem [31]. It is known that the total number
of coalitions grows exponentially with the number of agents
involved and most of the natural decision-making problems
related to coalition formation are NP-complete [31]. As the
search space complexity increases with the numbers of agents,
tasks, and resources, the cost of the above deterministic
search algorithms can increase hugely [29], making the search
of solutions infeasible. Another way to tackle this class of
problems is to find a suboptimal solution in a reasonable
time. Moreover, in some cases the optimal solution to the
problem with appropriate size may even be found [32], [33]. In
such optimization methods, meta-heuristic algorithms (MHAs)
have become powerful and popular for solving varieties of
coalition formation problems [34]–[39]. MHAs can be defined
as a set of nature-inspired and population-based stochastic
optimization techniques through the reproduction of genera-
tions [43], [44]. More specifically, see Fig. 1, the basic meta-
Input: The algorithmic parameters and the test instance
Output: The best found solution
1. Design a representation of an individual
2. Design a way of evaluating an individual
3. Create an initial population (usually at random)
4. Evaluate all the individuals
5. repeat
6. Select some individuals to be parents
7. Create offspring by evolutionary operations on the parents
8. Evaluate the offspring
9. Select some individuals to be replaced by the new better offspring
10. until A predefined criteria is met
Fig. 1. The psuedocode of the most basic meta-heuristic algorithm.
heuristic algorithm first designs a representation (or encoding)
of an individual and initializes every individual on the basis
of the representation to create the original population. Then,
use a fitness function (usually the objective function of the
given problem) to determine how good each individual is.
After that, execute evolutionary operations on selected parents
according to a series of methods (here is the major difference
among MHAs), such as selection, crossover, mutation, and
replacement, to modify and update each individual if necessary
and create the next generation that contains the best solutions
in the past. The algorithm repeats the above steps until a
termination criterion is met, such as the preset generation
number is reached or a solution with adequate objective
function value is found.
Particularly, considering agents, coalitions, and tasks as
a whole and dealing with OCSG in a parallel manner, we
improved BPSO [28] with a two-dimensional binary encoding
and presented a simple heuristic to repair infeasible individuals
[24]. However, this heuristic is rather rough and hard to make
each individual feasible.
Lin and Hu [25] argued that if a coalition is feasible for
its task, the remaining resources of this coalition except the
task’s needs can be transferred to a selected agent. Then, they
delegated this selected agent to join and help other infeasible
coalitions. However, on the basis of their approach, one only
knows the selected agent joins an infeasible coalition. It
remains unknown that which members in the previous feasible
coalition represented by the selected agent actually join the
infeasible coalition. This makes the final coalition structure
less practical.
After that, an agent-oriented heuristic (AOH) [26] was
presented to deal with the potential resource conflicts when
some coalitions compete each other for the same agents with
insufficient resources. AOH can show how many resources
each agent contributes to each coalition that it has joined.
However, AOH can only work in a very ideal environment
where agents have sufficient resources to accomplish all the
possible tasks. Moreover, AOH either provides solutions that
are of very low quality or has a very high computational
complexity (see Section IV for more details).
To address these shortcomings, in this paper we aim to
present a more efficient and effective heuristic for OCSG by
dynamically tracking each agent’s residual resources that may
be available for infeasible coalitions.
4III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
This section formalizes OCF in resource-constrained and
subadditive task oriented domains, which can be seen as
a natural extension of the traditional OCF [20]. Let A =
fa1;    ; ang denote a set of n 2 N agents with bounded
resources that have to cooperate to accomplish a set of possible
tasks T = ft1;    ; tmg (m 2 N).
Each task ti 2 T , i 2 f1;    ;mg, requires r 2 N types of
resources Di = hdi1;    ; diri, where dik  0, k 2 f1;    ; rg,
is a nonnegative integer and represents the amount of resource
of type k required by task ti. In addition, each ti 2 T has a
certain reward i > 0 that is a positive integer if ti can be
accomplished.
Each agent aj 2 A, j 2 f1;    ; ng, is endowed with r
types of original resources Bj = hbj1;    ; bjri, where bjk  0
is a nonnegative integer and denotes the amount of resource of
type k owned by agent aj . Besides, there is a coordination and
communication cost jj  0, j 2 f1;    ; ng and j 6= j,
between any two different agents aj and aj [5], [10], [25],
[26], [35], [37]. jj is a nonnegative integer, satisfying jj =
0 and jj = jj .
In OCF, an agent may contribute its resources to different
tasks at the same time. In this way, each agent aj 2 A has an
actual resource contribution,Wji = hwji1 ;    ; wjir i, for each
ti 2 T , where 0  wjik  bjk is a nonnegative integer and
denotes the amount of resource of type k contributed by aj to
ti. Note that if aj does not join ti, w
ji
k = 0, k 2 f1;    ; rg.
It follows logically that each agent aj 2 A has r types of
residual resources Pj = hpj1;    ; pjri, where 0  pjk  bjk is
the amount of the remaining resources of type k owned by
aj after it has distributed its original resources to its joined
tasks. If aj does not join any task, p
j
k = b
j
k, k 2 f1;    ; rg;
otherwise, pjk = b
j
k  
mP
i=1
wjik , k 2 f1;    ; rg.
A coalition Ci  A is a set of member agents with
responsibility for a task ti 2 T . Ci also has r types of
resources, BCi = hbCi1 ;    ; bCir i, where bCik  0 is the sum
of resources that members contribute to Ci for performing ti.
That is, bCik =
P
8aj2Ci
wjik = d
i
k, k 2 f1;    ; rg. Note that
if 9k 2 f1;    ; rg,
nP
j=1
pjk < d
i
k, it is impossible for Ci to
perform ti even if Ci = A, so we say that ti is unachievable
under the current residual resources of agents.
It should be noted that in subadditive task oriented domains,
each task is assigned at most one coalition of agents to
improve resource utilization and task execution efficiency [5],
[40], [41]. However, sometimes, a coalition may carry out
several different tasks at the same time if only it has rare, but
highly demanded resources. Then, we say that the assigned
overlapping coalitions to those different tasks are the same.
The value of a coalition Ci with responsibility for ti is
calculated by a characteristic function [5], [10], [25], [26],
[34], [35], [37]
(Ci) = i   (Ci) (1)
where (Ci) =
P
8aj ;aj2Ci;j<j
jj is the total intra-coalition
coordinate and communication costs among members in Ci
for carrying out ti. For example, if Ci = fa1; a2; a3g,
(Ci) = 12+ 13+ 23. Note that if ti is not achievable, Ci
is infeasible, and thus we say that Ci = ; and (Ci) = 0.
Moreover, it can be observed that (Ci) is a subadditive
function in which smaller coalition size is better. The reason
for this is that (Ci) grows exponentially with the number of
members in Ci [5], [10], [25], [26], [35], [37]. Hence, for the
given ti, Ci with smaller size has a higher coalition value in
subadditive task oriented domains [10], [40].
An overlapping coalition structure (OCS) fC1;    ; Cmg is
composed of m possible overlapping coalitions, each of which
is related to t1;    ; tm, respectively. As in the traditional OCF
[5], [10], [25], [26], we consider the value of an OCS in terms
of its social welfare. That is, the value of an OCS is the sum
of the values of its containing m overlapping coalitions:
(OCS) =
mX
i=1
(Ci) (2)
In particular, OCS = fC1;    ; Cmg satisfies the following
resource constraints.
nX
j=1
wjik = d
i
k; k 2 f1;    ; rg; i 2 f1;    ;mg; Ci 6= ; (3)
mX
i=1
wjik  bjk; k 2 f1;    ; rg; j 2 f1;    ; ng (4)
where constraint set (3) ensures that each feasible Ci can
satisfy the resource needs of ti; constraint set (4) ensures that
there is no resource conflict over the usage of agents’ resources
among m overlapping coalitions.
Let TA denote the set of possible overlapping coalition
structures over A and T . Given the preceding terms, the
problem of overlapping coalition structure generation (OCSG)
in OCF is then to find an optimal overlapping coalition
structure OCS to maximize the social welfare:
OCS = arg max
OCS2TA
(OCS) (5)
In summary, we describe the OCSG in OCF as the following
constrained optimization problem.8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
Maximize:
mP
i=1
(Ci)
Subject to:
dik =
nP
j=1
wjik ; k 2 f1;    ; rg; i 2 f1;    ;mg; Ci 6= ;
mP
i=1
wjik  bjk; k 2 f1;    ; rg; j 2 f1;    ; ng
Given the above formulations, we investigate the size of the
search space and the complexity of the OCSG problem in the
proposed OCF model.
Theorem 1: The total number of the possible overlapping
coalition structures is 2mn.
Proof: It is known that there are in total (2n   1)
nonempty coalitions for the given n agents [6], [31]. In OCF,
each agent may join these (2n   1) coalitions at the same
time. Accordingly, for each ti 2 T , there are 2n possibilities:
ti is not handled or is assigned a coalition from the (2n   1)
5nonempty coalitions. As there are m tasks in T , the number of
the possible overlapping coalition structures is (2n)m = 2mn.
It is clear that the size of the search space TA in the
proposed OCF model is extremely big. Ideally, all of the
tasks in T may be assigned and completed. However, in the
proposed OCF model the total available resources of all the
agents in A are limited. When we attempt to maximize the
social welfare, some tasks which have plenty of rewards may
be facilitated but others hindered. Accordingly, in an overlap-
ping coalition structure OCS = fC1;    ; Cmg, it is possible
that some coalitions may be the same or empty, and some
agents may not be selected to join any coalition. Then, we can
merge them altogether into one. For instance, given four agents
fa1; a2; a3; a4g and four tasks ft1; t2; t3; t4g. If a possible
OCS for the four tasks is ffa1; a2g; fa1; a2g; fa2; a4g; ;g, we
know that coalitions C1 = fa1; a2g for t1 and C2 = fa1; a2g
for t2 are the same, coalition C3 = fa2; a4g does t3, and
coalition C4 = ; means that t4 is not assigned. Here, a3 is
not selected by any coalition. In coalition structure generation
[6], a coalition structure is feasible only if any coalition cannot
be empty and the forming coalitions must cover all the given
agents in A. That is, the union of all the nonempty coalitions
in the OCS must be equal to A. To satisfy these constraints,
we can repair the original ffa1; a2g; fa1; a2g; fa2; a4g; ;g into
a feasible OCS ffa1; a2g; fa2; a4g; fa3gg in which fa1; a2g
carries out t1 and t2, fa2; a4g executes t3, and fa3g does
nothing.
Theorem 2: There are at most (m+1) coalitions in an OCS.
Proof: In OCS = fC1;    ; Cmg, there are at most
m different nonempty coalitions with a non-zero value for
t1;    ; tm. Beyond that, if
mS
i=1
Ci  A, some agents in A may
not be included in
mS
i=1
Ci. Then, according to the preceding
terms, we have to form coalition Cm+1 to contain these agents
that do nothing and ensure the completeness of OCS. Note
that the value of Cm+1 is zero because it does nothing. As a
result, there are at most (m+1) different nonempty coalitions
in a feasible OCS.
Theorem 3: The problem of OCSG in the proposed OCF
model is NP-complete.
Proof: It is known that the coalition structure generation
problem for Threshold Task Games (TTGs), a subclass of OCF
games, is NP-complete [20], [27]. In TTGs, each agent aj has
a weight !j . End each task ti has a threshold i and a utility ui.
Coalition Ci can do ti and obtain ui only if the sum of weights
of members in Ci is bigger than or equal to the threshold i of
ti. In the proposed OCF model, if we set r = 1 (i.e., there is
only one type of resource) and the communication cost jj
between any two different agents to be zero, the proposed
OCF model just becomes a simple TTGs. Hence, it is clear
that the problem of OCSG in the proposed OCF model is also
NP-complete on the basis of the reduction principle [42].
Theorem 4: All of the tasks in T can be successfully
assigned if and only if
nX
j=1
bjk 
mX
i=1
dik; k 2 f1;    ; rg (6)
Proof: We show the implications separately.
=): In this case, all of the tasks in T can be successfully
assigned, so each coalition Ci is feasible for each ti 2 T .
Then, we know that the corresponding OCS for T satisfies (3)
and (4). By (3), we can obtain
mX
i=1
nX
j=1
wjik =
mX
i=1
dik; k 2 f1;    ; rg (7)
According to (4), we have
nX
j=1
mX
i=1
wjik 
nX
j=1
bjk; k 2 f1;    ; rg (8)
Taking (7) and (8) altogether, we prove the results in (6).
(=: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that not all tasks
in T can be satisfied by agents in A. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the previous (m 1) tasks, t1;    ; tm 1, have
been successfully assigned and satisfied by agents in A, but
the last tm cannot be satisfied by the residual resources of
agents after they have responded the previous (m  1) tasks.
It means that for the previous (m  1) tasks, we have
m 1X
i=1
nX
j=1
wjik =
m 1X
i=1
dik; k 2 f1;    ; rg (9)
but for the last tm,
nX
j=1
pjk < d
m
k ; 9k 2 f1;    ; rg (10)
pjk = b
j
k  
m 1X
i=1
wjik ; k 2 f1;    ; rg (11)
Substituting (11) into (10), we can obtain
nX
j=1
bjk  
nX
j=1
m 1X
i=1
wjik < d
m
k ; 9k 2 f1;    ; rg (12)
By (9) and (12), we have
nX
j=1
bjk <
mX
i=1
dik; 9k 2 f1;    ; rg
which contradicts the initial condition (6), so we obtain that
all of the tasks in T can be successfully assigned.
Theorem 5: For 8C  A and 8T   T , as long asX
aj2C
bjk 
X
ti2T
dik; k 2 f1;    ; rg (13)
there certainly exists a feasible OCS.
Proof: By (13) and Theorem 4, we know that all of the
tasks in T  can be successfully assigned by agents in C.
That is, for each ti 2 T , there is a corresponding feasible
coalition Ci  C such that
S
8ti2T
Ci = C
. Moreover, there
is no resource conflict among coalitions for T . As a result,
6Fig. 2. An individual is represented by a two-dimensional binary encoding
and needs to be repaired for feasibility before evaluation.
we can obtain a feasible overlapping coalition structure by
merging the same coalitions and forming a new coalition for
agents that do nothing.
Theorem 6: If OCS is an optimal overlapping coalition
structure and there is an unassigned task ti 2 T , it is
impossible that
nX
j=1
pjk  dik; k 2 f1;    ; rg (14)
Proof: For the sake of contradiction suppose (14) holds.
We set T  = ftig and C is formed by agents in A that have
residual resources. By (14), we obtain that C and T  satisfy
(13) according to the residual resources of members in C.
Therefore, on the basis of Theorem 5, we have there certainly
exists a feasible OCS for T  with (OCS) > 0. Without
loss of generality, we assume OCS = fCg. Then, we have
(OCS[OCS) > (OCS), namely, OCS is not optimal,
so this is a contradiction.
IV. SOLVING THE OCSG PROBLEM
In this section, we present an efficient and effective heuristic
that can be used to strengthen the exploration ability of binary
MHAs for the OCSG problem. For the purpose of illustration,
we start by introducing the classical two-dimensional binary
encoding and recalling the existing agent-oriented heuristic
for individual repairs. After that, we show a generic task-
oriented heuristic for OCSG. Finally, we investigate several
fundamental properties of the proposed heuristic.
A. Two-Dimensional Binary Encoding
To show the combinatorial optimization characteristics of
the OCSG problem more intuitively, Fig. 2 depicts a simple
two-dimensional binary encoding, in which each row repre-
sents a task (or the corresponding coalition) and each column
denotes an agent. Let ij denote a bit in this encoding. If
ij = 1, aj will take part in Ci with responsibility for ti. If
ij = 0, aj will not join Ci. Each individual will be initialized
at random according to this encoding scheme. Then, each
individual represents a possible OCS = fC1;    ; Cmg and
the fitness value of each individual can be calculated on the
basis of (2). Note that there are m rows in the encoding for
the reason that there are at most m coalitions with a non-zero
value in the created OCS for the m given tasks.
For each individual, three important aspects should be
considered to ensure the created OCS is feasible and has as
much social welfare as possible. First of all, as shown in (3),
the endowed resources of each nonempty coalition need to be
rich enough to carry out its task. Next, as shown in (4), there is
no resource conflict over the usage of each agent’s resources,
even if an agent has joined several different coalitions at the
same time. Finally, no unassigned task can be satisfied by
the residual resources of agents, that is, the utilization rate of
agents’ resources needs to be maximized.
However, for each individual initialized randomly, we do
not know whether any of the above conditions is satisfied.
Furthermore, with the evolution of the MHAs, individuals
also stay changing. Is the corresponding OCS in the created
offspring individual feasible? If the embedded OCS in an
individual is infeasible, the individual is just infeasible and
its fitness value cannot be evaluated. A large amount of such
infeasible individuals will consumedly debase the availability
of population and weaken the performance of MHAs [43].
Hence, as shown in Fig. 2, before evaluating an individual we
have to repair it to be feasible. We need to make sure that
the repaired OCS satisfies the constraint sets (3) and (4). This
thus raises an open question: how to repair an individual for
feasibility and as much social welfare as possible?
To make individual repairs efficient and effective, we next
discuss the details of the agent-oriented heuristic [26] in the
following subsection, because of its relevance.
B. Agent-Oriented Heuristic
The agent-oriented heuristic (AOH) for generating an OCS
[26] is based upon the workload that each agent contributes
at least for each task. It proceeds in the following two
stages. First, check each row and make its corresponding
coalition feasible by randomly selecting available agents with
the required resources to join each infeasible coalition. Second,
check each agent to resolve potential resource conflicts. For
each column j (or agent aj), estimate the amount of resources
(i.e.,Wji) that each bit “1” in this column contributes at least
to each task ti. If 8k 2 f1;    ; rg, wjik = 0, aj is redundant
for Ci, so eliminate aj from Ci to reduce the size of Ci. If
9k 2 f1;    ; rg,
mP
i=1
wjik > p
j
k, aj does not have sufficient
residual resources to satisfy so many demands and a resource
conflict occurs. Then, let aj drop out of some coalitions until
mP
i=1
wjik  pjk, 8k 2 f1;    ; rg. Note that once aj withdraws
from a coalition Ci, Ci will be infeasible for ti, so other
available agents with required resources in the ith row need
to be selected to join Ci until Ci can meet ti. Finally, update
the residual resources of aj . Repeat the above steps until all
the columns have been checked and repaired.
Fig. 3 provides the pseudo-code for the two stages of the
AOH. Although AOH can resolve potential resource conflicts,
it must evaluate all the rows and columns. From a more tech-
nical point of view, AOH is complicated and time-consuming,
which can be verified by the below given complexity of the
AOH.
Theorem 7: Given an arbitrary OCF instance, the worst case
complexity of the AOH is O(m n2  r2).
7Input: A; T;B1;    ;Bn;D1;    ;Dm
Output: C1;    ; Cm
1. for i 2 f1;    ;mg do
2. Ci  ;
3. bCik  0; k 2 f1;    ; rg
4. end for
5. for j 2 f1;    ; ng do
6. pjk  bjk; k 2 f1;    ; rg
7. end for
8. repeat
9. Select randomly an unchecked row i
10. for j 2 f1;    ; ng do
11. if ij = 1 then
12. bCik  b
Ci
k + p
j
k; k 2 f1;    ; rg
13. end if
14. end for
15. while 9k 2 f1;    ; rg; bCik < dik do
16. Select randomly an available agent aj with the required resources
17. ij  1
18. bCik  b
Ci
k + p
j
k; k 2 f1;    ; rg
19. end while
20. until all rows have been checked
21. repeat
22. Select randomly an unchecked column j
23. for i 2 f1;    ;mg do
24. if ij = 1 then
25. bCik  0; k 2 f1;    ; rg
26. for j 2 f1;    ; ng do
27. if ij = 1 and j 6= j then
28. if 9k 2 f1;    ; rg; wjik > 0 then
29. bCik  b
Ci
k + w
ji
k ; k 2 f1;    ; rg
30. else
31. bCik  b
Ci
k + p
j
k ; k 2 f1;    ; rg
32. end if
33. end if
34. end for
35. wjik  dik   b
Ci
k ; k 2 f1;    ; rg
36. if 8k 2 f1;    ; rg; wjik = 0 then
37. ij  0
38. end if
39. end if
40. end for
41. while 9k 2 f1;    ; rg;
mP
i=1
wjik > p
j
k do
42. Select randomly a row i with wjik > 0 in the jth column
43. ij  0
44. wjik  0; k 2 f1;    ; rg
45. Recheck the ith row to ensure 8k 2 f1;    ; rg; bCik  dik
46. end while
47. pjk  pjk  
mP
i=1
wjik ; k 2 f1;    ; rg
48. until all columns have been checked
49. for i 2 f1;    ;mg do
50. for j 2 f1;    ; ng do
51. if ij = 1 then
52. Ci  Ci + aj
53. end if
54. end for
55. end for
Fig. 3. The agent-oriented heuristic for individual repairs.
Proof: See Fig. 3, all the n columns need to be traveled
to check whether there exist potential resource conflicts. First
of all, there are at most m bits “1” in the jth column. When
calculating eachWji, at total (n 1) bits will be evaluated to
register Ci’s members and count r types of resources, so the
number of operations required to estimate the total workload
of aj is O(m  n  r). Next, it is clear that all the r types
of resources must be checked to evaluate whether there exists
potential resource conflicts. If a resource conflict occurs, it
is possible that (m   1) bits “1” in the jth column will be
reset to “0” to let aj drop out of some coalitions. Once a bit
ij = 1 is reset to “0”, the ith row has to be rechecked
and then at most (n  1) agents and r types of resources will
be recorded to ensure the feasibility of Ci , so the number of
operations required to resolve potential resource conflicts over
aj is O(rmn r). In brief, the worst case complexity of
the AOH is O(n(mnr+rmnr)) = O(mn2r2)
rather than O(m n2  r) suggested in [26].
In Fig. 3, it can be observed that to evaluate each agent
aj’s resource contribution to every coalition, AOH has to
recalculate each BCi which has been traveled and saved
during row checks in advance. Moreover, once aj exits from
a coalition Ci, the the ith row must be checked again to
ensure the feasibility of Ci. This may bring the following
problems. First, once a conflict over a type of resource of
aj occurs, aj has to exit from some coalitions, even if there
is no conflict over other types of resources of aj , which
greatly reduces the utilization rate of aj’s resources. Second,
it is possible that aj is selected to join Ci again if it does
have the required residual resources during the repairs of the
successive columns. Then, the previous operation of aj’s exit
from Ci becomes superfluous and meaningless. Last, and most
importantly, if 9k 2 f1;    ; rg,
nP
j=1
bjk <
mP
i=1
dik, aj’s exit
from Ci may result in that it is impossible for Ci to be feasible
even if the residual resources of all the available agents are
considered. In this case, AOH would fall into an infinite loop
and could not obtain an OCS.
The underlying cause for those drawbacks stated above is
that AOH considers much about the two-dimensional binary
encoding but ignores the inherent relationship among agents,
coalitions, and tasks in the OCF model. In OCF, it is worth
noting that once a coalition Ci with responsibility for ti is
formed, there may be a large number of feasible resource-
allocation schemes for members in Ci to carry out ti. However,
the resource-allocation scheme is irrelative to (Ci) on the
basis of (1), so whichever allocation scheme members choose,
it will not change the value of Ci. Therefore, in the process
of individual repairs, it would not be worth making the
effort to spend so much time on estimating each agent’s
resource contribution for each task. Instead, we need to focus
on maximizing the utilization rate of agents’ resources and
making the OCS satisfy the constraint sets (3) and (4). To this
end, we present a generic task-oriented heuristic for individual
repairs and try to overcome the above outlined disadvantages.
C. Task-Oriented Heuristic
As mentioned earlier, if a possible OCS imbedded in an
individual is not repaired, we cannot know whether each
coalition is feasible and whether each agent has sufficient
resources to satisfy the needs of overlapping coalitions at the
same time. Hence, to create a feasible OCS efficiently and
effectively, we present a generic task-oriented heuristic (TOH)
by dynamically tracking each agent’s residual resources. The
main idea is as follows. For each task ti, if an agent aj is
chosen to join a coalition Ci with responsibility for ti, we
8Input: A; T;B1;    ;Bn;D1;    ;Dm
Output: C1;    ; Cm
1. for i 2 f1;    ;mg do
2. Ci  ;
3. bCik  0; k 2 f1;    ; rg
4. end for
5. for j 2 f1;    ; ng do
6. pjk  bjk; k 2 f1;    ; rg
7. end for
8. repeat
9. Select randomly an unchecked row i
10. if 9k 2 f1;    ; rg;
nP
j=1
pjk < d
i
k then
11. for j 2 f1;    ; ng do
12. if ij = 1 then
13. ij  0
14. end if
15. end for
16. else
17. repeat
18. Select randomly an unevaluated ij = 1 in the ith row
19. if 8k 2 f1;    ; rg;minfdik   bCik ; pjkg = 0 then
20. ij  0
21. else
22. Ci  Ci + aj
23. wjik  minfdik   b
Ci
k ; p
j
kg; k 2 f1;    ; rg
24. pjk  pjk   wjik ; k 2 f1;    ; rg
25. bCik  b
Ci
k + w
ji
k ; k 2 f1;    ; rg
26. end if
27. until all the bits “1” in the ith row are evaluated
28. while 9k 2 f1;    ; rg; bCik < dik do
29. Select randomly a bit with minfdik   bCik ; pjkg > 0 in the ith row
30. if ij = 0 then
31. ij  1
32. Ci  Ci + aj
33. end if
34. wjik  minfdik   b
Ci
k ; p
j
kg
35. pjk  pjk   wjik
36. bCik  b
Ci
k + w
ji
k
37. end while
38. end if
39. until all the rows have been checked
Fig. 4. The task-oriented heuristic for individual repairs.
first maximize aj’s actual resource contribution to Ci and then
update aj’s residual resources. After that, aj can join other
tasks only by using its residual resources. Once aj has used
up all the endowed resources, it will not respond any task.
A brief description of the main stages of the proposed TOH
is displayed as follows. Check all the rows and evaluate the
feasibility of each row (or coalition). For the ith row, we need
to evaluate the availability of each agent for ti. Specifically, if
9k 2 f1;    ; rg,
nP
j=1
pjk < d
i
k, by Theorems 4 and 5 we know
that it is impossible for Ci to be feasible, even if Ci = A. As
a result, in the ith row, for each ij = 1, we set ij  0 to
prevent any agent from carrying out ti. If 8k 2 f1;    ; rg,
nP
j=1
pjk  dik, it is certain that Ci can be repaired to be feasible
for ti. Then, for each ij = 1, we consider the following:
 If 9k 2 f1;    ; rg, bCik < dik and aj has required
resources, calculate Wji (the amount of resources that
aj can contribute at most to ti) according to
wjik  minfdik   bCik ; pjkg; k 2 f1;    ; rg (15)
and update aj’s residual resources, p
j
k  pjk   wjik , k 2
f1;    ; rg.
 If 9k 2 f1;    ; rg, bCik < dik but aj has no available
resource for ti, aj is useless for Ci and then let aj exit
from Ci by setting ij  0.
 If 8k 2 f1;    ; rg, bCik = dik, Ci has been feasible and
aj is superfluous for Ci, so we set ij  0 to exclude
aj from Ci and reduce the size of Ci.
After that, if 9k 2 f1;    ; rg, bCik < dik still holds, we
evaluate the availability of bits “0” in the ith row and select
available agents from A   Ci with the required resources to
join Ci until 8k 2 f1;    ; rg, bCik = dik.
The pseudo-code of the TOH is presented in Fig. 4. It can
be observed that before adjusting Ci for ti, we first evaluate
whether the residual resources of agents can satisfy the needs
of ti to avoid the useless repair operations and possible infinite
loop that occurs in AOH. Beyond that, aj will join Ci only
if aj has the available residual resources required by ti,
which can effectively prevent conflicts over agents’ resources.
Moreover, once aj is evaluated to be available for ti, aj will
do its utmost to contribute its residual resources to ti. On
the contrary, in AOH each agent aj tries to contribute as
few resources as possible to ti. Therefore, TOH is good at
maximizing the utilization rate of agents’ resources, reducing
the size of Ci, and thus increasing the value of Ci. Finally,
it is clear that in the OCS repaired by TOH no unassigned
task can be satisfied by the residual resources of agents, so
by Theorem 6, we know that TOH can make the created OCS
reach as close as possible to the optimal.
On the other hand, it should be noted that in TOH each
infeasible coalition is repaired in a random manner. The reason
is that MHAs are easy to fall into local optimum, especially
dealing with huge amount of data [43]. Repairing agents and
coalitions randomly in an individual can maintain diversity in
the population to a certain extent and make the MHAs escape
from the local optima and explore solutions as fully as possible
[43].
In addition to the above, we now further analyze the
difficulty of repairing an individual in TOH and whether the
corresponding OCS can be repaired to be feasible. We have
the following results.
Theorem 8: The worst case complexity of the TOH for
individual repairs is O(m n r).
Proof: See Fig. 4, in TOH at most m rows (or tasks) are
checked. Once a row i is selected, we first need to evaluate
whether the total residual resources of all the n agents can
satisfy the needs of ti. Because each type of resources needs
to be checked, the number of operations required for the
evaluation is O(n  r). If 9k 2 f1;    ; rg,
nP
j=1
pjk < d
i
k,
there are at most n bits “1” that may be set to “0”. If
8k 2 f1;    ; rg,
nP
j=1
pjk  dik, there are at most n bits “1”
that may be evaluated. For each ij = 1, we need to reuse
all the r types of resources to estimateWji. As a result, the
number of operations required to evaluate bits “1” in the ith
row is O(n r). After that, if 9k 2 f1;    ; rg,
nP
j=1
pjk < d
i
k
9TABLE I
RANGE OF PARAMETERS FOR OCF INSTANCES IN ALL THE NUMERICAL
EXPERIMENTS
dik i b
j
k jj
[0,100] [50,1000] [0,10] [0,10]
still holds, we need to select at most n agents to help Ci.
Since at most r types of resources should be checked, the
number of operations required to select available agents is also
O(n r). To sum up, the worst case complexity of the TOH
is O(m (nr+n+nr+nr)), namely, O(mnr).
Theorem 9: Any individual can be repaired to contain a
feasible OCS by TOH.
Proof: We show the implications separately. We first
prove that there certainly exists a feasible OCS in an individual
after it is repaired. Next, we prove that the final OCS repaired
by TOH is feasible.
In TOH ti can be assigned only if the resource needs of
ti can be satisfied by the total residual resources of all the
agents, namely, 8k 2 f1;    ; rg,
nP
j=1
pjk  dik. For each
feasible coalition Ci and each assigned task ti in the repaired
individual, we set C =
mS
i=1
Ci and T  =
mS
i=1;Ci 6=;
ftig. Then,
it is clear that C and T  satisfy (13). According to Theorem
5, we obtain that there certainly exists a feasible OCS on the
basis of TOH.
On the other hand, as long as 8k 2 f1;    ; rg,
nP
j=1
pjk 
dik, Ci will be formed to carry out ti; otherwise, Ci = ;.
Additionally, each agent aj will not join Ci unless aj has the
residual resources required by ti. Hence, according to (15),
we can easily obtain that each feasible coalition Ci for ti in
an individual satisfies (3) and each aj that has joined tasks
satisfies (4). That is, the repaired OCS is feasible.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To verify the proposed TOH, we now present empirical
results against AOH on the basis of three popular binary
MHAs: genetic algorithm (GA) [35], BPSO [39], and binary
differential evolution (BDE) [45]. To make the comparisons as
fair as possible, we adopt the basic algorithmic parameters of
GA, BPSO, and BDE that were recommended in [35], [39],
[45]. In common, the population size is 30 and the maximal
generation number is 500. Additionally, the crossover and
mutation probabilities in GA are 0.9 and 0.1, respectively;
in BPSO, the two learning factors are both set to 2.0 and the
maximal velocity of each particle is 5.0; in BDE, the crossover
and mutation rates are 0.25 and 1.0, respectively.
Particularly, we test TOH and AOH in the following three
classical experimental environments:
 The relaxed environment where the sum of the available
resources of all agents is more than the sum of the
required resources of all tasks, namely,
nP
j=1
bjk >
mP
i=1
dik,
k 2 f1;    ; rg.
TABLE II
MEAN RUN TIME (95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF THE MEAN, IN
SECONDS) CONSUMED BY TOH AND AOH WITH DIFFERENT INSTANCES
IN THE RELAXED ENVIRONMENT
Instance
GA BPSO BDE
AOH TOH AOH TOH AOH TOH
No.1 0.390.01 0.150.01 0.370.03 0.160.02 0.430.03 0.140.01
No.2 0.470.04 0.170.02 0.400.04 0.180.02 0.430.03 0.150.02
No.3 0.450.03 0.150.01 0.400.04 0.170.02 0.390.03 0.150.01
No.4 0.500.04 0.150.02 0.470.04 0.210.02 0.470.04 0.170.02
No.5 0.490.04 0.150.01 0.460.05 0.200.02 0.450.03 0.160.02
No.6 0.510.04 0.160.01 0.440.03 0.180.02 0.450.03 0.180.02
No.7 0.540.04 0.160.01 0.440.04 0.210.02 0.480.04 0.200.02
No.8 0.490.04 0.160.01 0.450.05 0.190.01 0.450.03 0.190.02
No.9 0.520.05 0.170.01 0.450.04 0.200.02 0.490.05 0.160.01
No.10 0.480.04 0.140.01 0.400.04 0.160.02 0.430.03 0.180.02
No.11 0.490.04 0.170.02 0.440.04 0.180.02 0.460.04 0.190.02
No.12 0.480.03 0.150.01 0.350.04 0.170.01 0.380.04 0.190.02
No.13 0.520.04 0.160.01 0.450.04 0.200.02 0.480.04 0.180.01
No.14 0.510.04 0.170.01 0.410.04 0.180.03 0.430.03 0.190.02
No.15 0.520.04 0.150.02 0.410.04 0.190.02 0.450.03 0.200.02
No.16 0.460.04 0.160.01 0.400.03 0.180.02 0.390.03 0.190.02
No.17 0.510.04 0.160.02 0.420.04 0.190.02 0.460.03 0.200.02
No.18 0.560.04 0.160.01 0.440.04 0.190.02 0.510.03 0.210.03
No.19 0.520.04 0.160.01 0.440.04 0.180.02 0.450.03 0.190.02
No.20 0.530.04 0.150.01 0.390.03 0.180.02 0.450.03 0.200.02
No.21 0.530.04 0.160.01 0.400.04 0.170.02 0.410.04 0.200.02
No.22 0.490.04 0.160.01 0.390.04 0.190.02 0.500.01 0.190.02
No.23 0.540.04 0.150.01 0.490.04 0.210.02 0.570.02 0.200.02
No.24 0.530.04 0.160.01 0.450.04 0.130.01 0.530.02 0.200.02
No.25 0.540.05 0.170.01 0.470.04 0.150.01 0.540.02 0.190.02
No.26 0.570.05 0.160.01 0.460.04 0.160.01 0.620.01 0.220.03
No.27 0.510.04 0.160.01 0.390.03 0.120.01 0.470.02 0.190.02
No.28 0.510.04 0.160.01 0.440.04 0.120.01 0.510.03 0.190.02
No.29 0.520.04 0.150.01 0.420.03 0.130.02 0.570.03 0.210.02
No.30 0.530.04 0.150.01 0.460.04 0.130.01 0.510.02 0.200.02
 The tight environment in which the sum of the available
resources of all agents is just equal to the sum of the
required resources of all tasks, namely,
nP
j=1
bjk =
mP
i=1
dik,
k 2 f1;    ; rg.
 The harsh environment in which the sum of the available
resources of all agents is smaller than the sum of the
required resources of all tasks, namely,
nP
j=1
bjk <
mP
i=1
dik,
k 2 f1;    ; rg.
Following the studies in [26], [35], [39], we generate
every OCF instance randomly in the above three experimental
environments according to the range of parameters listed in
Table I. Beyond that, each OCF instance is tested repeatedly
for 30 independent runs with different random seeds on a PC
with Intel 2.50 GHz CPU and 10 GB of RAM.
A. Impact of the Repair Operations
In the process of individual repairs, setting bits “0” to “1”
(i.e., selecting available agents to join a coalition Ci) will
increase the size of Ci, bring extra communication cost, and
thus decrease the value of Ci. In contrast, setting bits “1” to
“0” (i.e., winkling unavailable agents out of Ci) will reduce
the size of Ci and thus increase the value of Ci. It is clear
that the repair operations will affect the value of the created
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(c) In the harsh environment
Fig. 5. The average numbers of the repair operations executed by TOH and AOH.
OCS. Therefore, in the first experiment we analyze the impact
of the repair operations in TOH and AOH.
Now, in terms of 20 agents (i.e., n = 20), 5 tasks (i.e.,
m = 5), and 5 resources (i.e., r = 5), we generated 30
different test instances randomly on the basis of the pre-
defined intervals in Table I, considering the relaxed, the tight,
and the harsh environments, respectively. Moreover, for the
generated instances, there are more than two levels of the
relaxed and harsh environments.
Fig. 5 shows the average numbers of the repair operations
executed by TOH and AOH in GA, BPSO, and BDE. It can be
observed that in both the relaxed and tight environments, the
numbers of the repair operations required by TOH are much
smaller than those required by AOH. In the harsh environment,
the possible resource conflicts occur more often, so AOH
fell easily into an infinite loop, while TOH executed less
than 600,000 repair operations in each search algorithm. Like
what we had initially expected, on average, TOH required
far fewer repair operations in all the 90 OCF instances. The
reason is that on the basis of (15), TOH can make each agent
contribute the most amounts of its resources to a coalition,
which reduces the chance of other agents joining the coalition.
On the contrary, AOH makes each agent contribute the least
amounts of its resources to a coalition, so AOH has to select
a number of other available agents to join the coalition for
satisfying the corresponding task.
The above observations also imply the efficiency of TOH
in comparison with AOH. Specifically, Tables II-IV show the
mean run time (95% confidence interval of the mean [46], in
seconds) consumed by TOH and AOH with different instances
in the three environments. Note that here for fairness, we only
count the total time consumed by TOH and AOH rather than
the total running time of the search algorithm. As can be seen
from Tables II-IV, TOH consumed less time than AOH on all
the 90 OCF instances. Note that in the harsh environment AOH
fell into an infinite loop, because no available agent could be
selected to join an infeasible coalition when some members
exited from the coalition. In contrast, TOH has a clear way to
avoid impossible tasks by estimating the total amount of the
residual resources of all the agents.
Tables V-VII show the coalition structure values (mean and
standard deviation) obtained by TOH and AOH with different
instances in the three environments. It can be found that the
coalition structure values obtained by TOH are higher than
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TABLE III
MEAN RUN TIME (95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF THE MEAN, IN
SECONDS) CONSUMED BY TOH AND AOH WITH DIFFERENT INSTANCES
IN THE TIGHT ENVIRONMENT
Instance
GA BPSO BDE
AOH TOH AOH TOH AOH TOH
No.1 0.990.07 0.210.01 0.870.06 0.180.02 0.780.02 0.270.02
No.2 1.080.07 0.200.01 1.040.07 0.180.02 0.840.02 0.240.02
No.3 0.990.07 0.170.02 0.940.07 0.170.01 0.820.02 0.240.02
No.4 1.090.08 0.210.02 1.050.07 0.180.01 0.940.06 0.250.02
No.5 1.110.08 0.200.01 1.010.08 0.200.02 1.020.07 0.290.02
No.6 1.050.07 0.200.01 0.940.06 0.200.02 0.930.07 0.260.02
No.7 1.080.08 0.190.02 1.070.08 0.200.02 1.100.08 0.280.02
No.8 1.140.07 0.200.01 0.960.06 0.200.02 1.070.08 0.250.02
No.9 1.090.08 0.190.01 1.070.08 0.180.01 1.150.08 0.240.02
No.10 0.950.07 0.190.01 0.930.08 0.190.02 0.960.07 0.290.03
No.11 1.070.08 0.270.02 0.970.07 0.180.01 1.050.08 0.260.03
No.12 0.970.07 0.260.03 0.940.07 0.180.01 0.950.07 0.230.02
No.13 1.050.08 0.250.03 0.990.07 0.190.01 1.060.08 0.260.03
No.14 1.030.08 0.260.03 0.990.08 0.190.01 1.090.08 0.240.03
No.15 1.060.08 0.260.02 1.060.08 0.170.02 1.030.08 0.270.03
No.16 0.970.07 0.270.03 0.900.06 0.200.02 0.940.07 0.260.04
No.17 1.070.08 0.290.02 1.020.07 0.180.02 1.140.08 0.260.02
No.18 1.140.08 0.270.02 1.070.08 0.180.02 1.120.08 0.250.03
No.19 1.070.07 0.280.02 1.010.07 0.190.01 1.080.07 0.290.03
No.20 1.050.08 0.280.03 1.100.07 0.180.01 1.110.08 0.260.03
No.21 1.050.07 0.260.02 0.990.07 0.180.01 1.040.08 0.270.03
No.22 0.980.09 0.250.03 0.990.07 0.170.01 1.030.07 0.230.02
No.23 1.120.08 0.290.03 1.090.08 0.180.02 1.160.08 0.250.02
No.24 1.050.08 0.260.02 1.080.07 0.170.01 1.080.08 0.270.03
No.25 1.050.07 0.310.03 1.020.07 0.190.01 1.070.08 0.260.02
No.26 1.210.09 0.300.03 1.150.08 0.190.02 1.160.09 0.290.02
No.27 0.990.08 0.280.03 0.930.08 0.170.01 1.080.07 0.260.02
No.28 1.060.08 0.270.03 1.010.07 0.200.02 1.080.08 0.260.02
No.29 1.140.09 0.280.02 1.040.07 0.190.01 1.130.08 0.260.03
No.30 1.000.07 0.290.02 0.990.08 0.190.01 1.090.08 0.270.03
those obtained by AOH on all the 90 OCF instances. Moreover,
we used the Wilcoxon rank-sum test [47] at a 0.05 significance
level to measure the significance of the differences between
the results obtained by TOH and AOH. We found that all the
differences between TOH and AOH are highly significant in
both the tight and the harsh environments. Particularly, in the
harsh environment TOH still obtained considerable coalition
structure values, while AOH failed in exploration for the
reason that all the AOH entries are not available.
To summarize, in the relaxed environment TOH is slightly
better than AOH, but in both the tight and the harsh environ-
ments, TOH significantly outperforms AOH on the runtime
and the coalition structure value. The repair operations in
TOH are simple and effective, can present clear heuristic
information, and enable GA, BPSO, and BDE to explore high-
value overlapping coalitions quickly.
B. Impact of the Problem Size
AOH does not work in the harsh environment. Hence, here
we consider the impact of the problem size (i.e., different
numbers of agents, tasks, and resources) to further show the
differences between TOH and AOH in both the relaxed and
the tight environments. Theorem 7 shows that AOH is more
sensitive to the values of n and r than the value of m. In
addition, Theorem 8 implies that TOH is not sensitive to
TABLE IV
MEAN RUN TIME (95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF THE MEAN, IN
SECONDS) CONSUMED BY TOH WITH DIFFERENT INSTANCES IN THE
HARSH ENVIRONMENT
Instance
GA BPSO BDE
TOH TOH TOH
No.1 0.220.02 0.140.01 0.240.02
No.2 0.210.02 0.150.01 0.200.02
No.3 0.230.02 0.140.02 0.190.02
No.4 0.240.03 0.150.01 0.210.02
No.5 0.210.02 0.160.01 0.180.02
No.6 0.230.03 0.150.01 0.240.02
No.7 0.200.02 0.150.01 0.190.03
No.8 0.180.02 0.140.02 0.170.02
No.9 0.200.02 0.120.01 0.200.02
No.10 0.220.02 0.150.01 0.190.02
No.11 0.220.02 0.160.01 0.190.02
No.12 0.210.02 0.140.01 0.180.01
No.13 0.230.03 0.150.01 0.200.02
No.14 0.210.02 0.140.01 0.170.01
No.15 0.210.02 0.150.01 0.190.01
No.16 0.190.02 0.140.01 0.170.01
No.17 0.220.02 0.150.01 0.180.02
No.18 0.200.02 0.120.01 0.170.01
No.19 0.240.03 0.170.01 0.200.02
No.20 0.230.02 0.130.01 0.170.02
No.21 0.230.03 0.140.01 0.210.02
No.22 0.190.02 0.150.01 0.200.02
No.23 0.220.02 0.160.02 0.190.02
No.24 0.160.02 0.110.01 0.160.02
No.25 0.210.02 0.150.01 0.200.02
No.26 0.190.02 0.130.01 0.180.01
No.27 0.240.02 0.140.01 0.210.02
No.28 0.240.02 0.140.01 0.200.02
No.29 0.240.02 0.150.02 0.210.03
No.30 0.210.02 0.140.01 0.210.02
the values of m, n, and r. To verify the theoretical results
in Theorems 7 and 8 and discuss the potential application
scenarios of the AOH and TOH, in this section we tested
the impact of one factor with the other factors fixed and
taken small values. This test method was used in [26], [29],
[39] to reduce the interference of the other factors over the
experimental results, when one factor was evaluated. The
reason is that if all the testing instances are generated with
random values of m, n, and r, it is not known which factors
contribute to the change of the experimental results.
1) Different numbers of agents: First of all, we evaluated
the performance of the TOH and AOH with different numbers
of agents (i.e., n, ranging from 30 to 100) and the fixed
numbers of tasks and resources (i.e., m = 5 and r = 5).
Fig. 6 shows the average time consumption (in seconds) of
TOH and AOH for different n. It can be found that in both
the relaxed and the tight environments, TOH is much faster
than AOH and the gap between TOH and AOH is greatly
widening with the increase of n. For example, in the relaxed
environment TOH took less than 38% and 43% of the time
consumed by AOH when n = 30 and n = 100, respectively. In
the tight environment, TOH took less than only 20% and 11%
of the time when n = 30 and n = 100, respectively. The above
observations imply that AOH is very sensitive to n in the tight
environment, which coincides with the results in Theorem 7.
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TABLE V
COALITION STRUCTURE VALUES (MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION)
OBTAINED BY TOH AND AOH WITH DIFFERENT INSTANCES IN THE
RELAXED ENVIRONMENT
Instance
GA BPSO BDE
AOH TOH AOH TOH AOH TOH
No.1 1571(15) 1608(6) 1584(20) 1612(9) 1593(10) 1602(6)
No.2 1380(15) 1428(7) 1384(22) 1436(11) 1402(10) 1419(6)
No.3 1277(13) 1323(6) 1283(18) 1327(6) 1294(9) 1313(6)
No.4 1377(15) 1423(9) 1380(21) 1436(12) 1398(11) 1415(8)
No.5 1398(17) 1464(9) 1392(26) 1463(9) 1416(10) 1447(10)
No.6 1513(16) 1578(10) 1514(18) 1582(9) 1539(11) 1567(6)
No.7 1346(18) 1413(8) 1353(19) 1422(9) 1379(13) 1403(6)
No.8 1313(17) 1360(10) 1311(23) 1370(10) 1335(14) 1350(8)
No.9 1102(19) 1169(10) 1112(23) 1176(10) 1134(12) 1156(8)
No.10 1266(12) 1304(6) 1279(21) 1312(6) 1285(9) 1297(6)
No.11 1123(15) 1181(10) 1131(22) 1196(10) 1153(11) 1171(7)
No.12 1155(13) 1190(8) 1160(19) 1200(6) 1176(8) 1185(9)
No.13 1196(23) 1249(7) 1203(23) 1261(7) 1213(12) 1243(8)
No.14 1304(15) 1352(9) 1303(28) 1355(8) 1319(15) 1339(8)
No.15 1319(13) 1367(8) 1321(27) 1382(14) 1342(14) 1360(10)
No.16 1201(16) 1241(8) 1200(23) 1249(9) 1220(10) 1231(7)
No.17 1189(14) 1232(9) 1179(25) 1240(8) 1197(10) 1221(8)
No.18 1318(24) 1388(10) 1324(25) 1395(9) 1342(14) 1367(8)
No.19 1480(20) 1538(9) 1488(28) 1546(8) 1497(15) 1525(9)
No.20 1199(15) 1233(8) 1207(25) 1241(9) 1212(10) 1221(8)
No.21 1425(17) 1471(7) 1434(17) 1479(7) 1448(9) 1467(5)
No.22 1466(13) 1493(7) 1465(16) 1505(5) 1474(8) 1487(7)
No.23 1193(19) 1253(7) 1187(23) 1267(11) 1209(13) 1246(9)
No.24 1310(16) 1369(11) 1313(21) 1378(8) 1331(16) 1354(8)
No.25 1346(18) 1394(7) 1343(21) 1403(7) 1367(9) 1383(7)
No.26 1465(23) 1531(12) 1470(28) 1545(12) 1484(16) 1518(11)
No.27 1690(11) 1720(5) 1700(16) 1730(5) 1705(8) 1714(5)
No.28 1210(18) 1275(8) 1222(20) 1281(7) 1241(11) 1267(7)
No.29 1483(20) 1544(9) 1482(25) 1550(8) 1503(15) 1532(9)
No.30 1259(17) 1301(7) 1258(26) 1311(7) 1277(9) 1294(8)
This is because in the tight environment, AOH has to check
each column (which represents an agent) to resolve intense
resource conflicts, and thus with the increase of n, a large
amount of repeated and redundant operations are produced,
which progressively increases the time consumption of the
AOH.
Fig. 7 illustrates the average coalition structure values
obtained by TOH and AOH for different n. As can be seen,
with the increase of n, the difference between TOH and AOH
in the relaxed environment is slight. However, in the tight
environment, the coalition structure value obtained by TOH
is much higher than that obtained by AOH, and the coalition
structure values obtained by TOH or AOH have shown a sharp
decline with the increase of n. Moreover, when n  80,
AOH failed in exploring feasible coalitions. The reason for
this is that in the tight environment all the agents have to
join coalitions to accomplish all the given tasks, and with
the increase of n, each coalition contains a large number of
members, which results in high communication cost and thus
reduces the coalition structure value greatly. Additionally, in
the relaxed environment the coalition structure values given
by both TOH and AOH decreased slowly with the increase of
n. An explanation is that the number of possible coalitions is
2n   1 [31], and with the increase of n, the search abilities
of GA, BPSO, and BDE may weaken gradually in high-
TABLE VI
COALITION STRUCTURE VALUES (MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION)
OBTAINED BY TOH AND AOH WITH DIFFERENT INSTANCES IN THE
TIGHT ENVIRONMENT
Instance
GA BPSO BDE
AOH TOH AOH TOH AOH TOH
No.1 1218(46) 1370(15) 1224(46) 1374(19) 1206(28) 1342(19)
No.2 990(55) 1183(20) 964(42) 1178(27) 961(37) 1137(18)
No.3 966(44) 1093(12) 928(60) 1092(22) 906(31) 1065(11)
No.4 941(48) 1129(17) 926(67) 1118(32) 911(45) 1092(24)
No.5 913(56) 1164(22) 882(75) 1169(22) 884(38) 1147(18)
No.6 1110(29) 1318(23) 1106(63) 1306(21) 1135(34) 1302(17)
No.7 832(57) 1141(16) 802(68) 1122(25) 816(47) 1106(23)
No.8 788(42) 1039(17) 728(79) 1025(23) 770(41) 1011(18)
No.9 601(56) 875(18) 573(89) 859(25) 599(45) 855(25)
No.10 916(49) 1077(15) 882(72) 1081(25) 894(45) 1050(19)
No.11 708(41) 949(23) 680(72) 942(38) 704(51) 916(18)
No.12 822(54) 974(23) 797(54) 976(21) 821(39) 949(10)
No.13 827(53) 1035(23) 838(72) 1022(25) 844(45) 1011(15)
No.14 808(50) 1064(24) 774(51) 1065(42) 773(60) 1013(23)
No.15 845(47) 1075(22) 817(100) 1069(27) 785(47) 1051(16)
No.16 811(41) 987(15) 775(52) 975(22) 800(33) 961(13)
No.17 644(42) 883(24) 601(40) 878(25) 599(30) 847(19)
No.18 783(64) 1105(28) 750(70) 1096(39) 761(61) 1059(29)
No.19 1055(42) 1218(21) 1031(68) 1208(28) 1026(66) 1177(23)
No.20 623(54) 895(22) 568(75) 896(32) 575(47) 871(21)
No.21 934(48) 1208(22) 930(62) 1198(28) 930(36) 1176(16)
No.22 1133(35) 1264(15) 1097(35) 1264(27) 1078(32) 1224(15)
No.23 592(48) 942(18) 547(88) 926(20) 554(55) 919(17)
No.24 744(51) 1074(20) 698(56) 1061(28) 708(38) 1039(19)
No.25 980(45) 1131(17) 935(58) 1123(17) 934(41) 1115(19)
No.26 869(44) 1161(24) 836(87) 1154(35) 821(47) 1133(28)
No.27 1384(34) 1493(21) 1351(53) 1502(22) 1350(32) 1469(17)
No.28 728(47) 1010(19) 748(78) 998(20) 753(52) 995(15)
No.29 953(64) 1237(21) 919(71) 1230(31) 905(46) 1203(24)
No.30 838(44) 1041(17) 778(69) 1033(20) 807(55) 1020(17)
dimensional spaces [43].
2) Different numbers of tasks: Here, given fixed numbers
of agents and resources (i.e., n = 20 and r = 5), we tested
the performance of the TOH and AOH for different numbers
of tasks (i.e., m, ranging from 10 to 45).
Fig. 8 depicts the average time consumption (in seconds)
of the TOH and AOH for different m. It can be observed
that although TOH is always faster than AOH, the difference
between TOH and AOH increases slowly. For example, in the
relaxed environment TOH took less than 65% and 57% of
the time consumed by AOH when m = 10 and m = 45,
respectively. In the tight environment, TOH took less than
36% and 52% of the time when m = 10 and m = 45,
respectively. The above observations reflect that neither of
TOH and AOH is sensitive to m. The reason is that in both
TOH and AOH checking each row is relatively simple and the
potential resource conflicts occur only in each column.
Fig. 9 shows the average coalition structure values obtained
by TOH and AOH for differentm. It can be found that with the
increase of m, the average coalition structure values obtained
by both TOH and AOH soar. This is because the increase
of m brings more rewards, but the numbers of agents and
resources are fixed and thus the total communication cost
is bounded, which results in the continuous increase of the
coalition structure value. Note that in the tight environment the
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TABLE VII
COALITION STRUCTURE VALUES (MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION)
OBTAINED BY TOH WITH DIFFERENT INSTANCES IN THE HARSH
ENVIRONMENT
Instance
GA BPSO BDE
TOH TOH TOH
No.1 762(11) 763(13) 733(18)
No.2 642(15) 644(20) 618(16)
No.3 688(12) 687(18) 665(10)
No.4 672(15) 664(18) 630(13)
No.5 576(16) 570(21) 551(18)
No.6 822(14) 815(16) 790(17)
No.7 651(21) 642(21) 608(20)
No.8 526(7) 523(8) 517(8)
No.9 363(21) 372(26) 353(19)
No.10 613(23) 595(20) 570(20)
No.11 432(36) 427(35) 393(17)
No.12 502(15) 496(19) 482(15)
No.13 575(22) 545(25) 529(21)
No.14 736(13) 739(11) 720(10)
No.15 540(16) 534(15) 517(14)
No.16 550(11) 547(15) 528(13)
No.17 588(18) 590(23) 551(14)
No.18 437(24) 451(37) 421(24)
No.19 658(15) 649(21) 610(20)
No.20 535(11) 535(14) 511(12)
No.21 629(16) 617(22) 604(16)
No.22 841(11) 847(11) 827(11)
No.23 561(17) 549(22) 534(12)
No.24 485(4) 485(5) 480(5)
No.25 598(27) 584(32) 559(22)
No.26 513(13) 513(14) 492(14)
No.27 876(21) 875(16) 854(13)
No.28 445(11) 446(19) 431(9)
No.29 704(22) 698(25) 671(19)
No.30 531(20) 511(22) 479(22)
coalition structure value obtained by TOH is higher than that
obtained by AOH. In the relaxed environment the difference
between TOH and AOH is slight when m is reasonably small.
However, with the increase of m, the difference also increases.
An explanation is that whenm is small, each task can be easily
satisfied by agents’ sufficient resources, so the effect of the
repair heuristic is limited. On the other hand, the increase of
m reduces the gap between agents’ total resources and tasks’s
required resources, while the exploration ability of TOH in the
harsh situation is stronger than that of AOH.
3) Different numbers of resources: Finally, given the fixed
numbers of agents and tasks (i.e., n = 20 and m = 5), we
analyzed the performance of the TOH and AOH for different
numbers of resources (i.e., r, ranging from 10 to 45).
Fig. 10 illustrates the average time consumption (in seconds)
of the TOH and AOH for different r. As can be seen from
Fig. 10, whether in the relaxed or tight environment, TOH is
much faster than AOH and the gap between TOH and AOH
keeps widening with the increase of r. For example, in the
relaxed environment TOH took less than 37% and 29% of
the time consumed by AOH when r = 10 and r = 45,
respectively. In the tight environment, TOH took less than
only 21% and 18% of the time when r = 10 and r = 45,
respectively. The above observations indicate that AOH is
very sensitive to r, which is in line with the computational
complexity results in Theorem 7.
Fig. 11 shows the average coalition structure values obtained
by TOH and AOH for different r. It can be observed that
with the increase of r, the difference between TOH and AOH
increases greatly in both the relaxed and the tight environ-
ments. Particularly, in the tight environment when r  30,
AOH failed in exploring feasible coalitions, but TOH still
obtained high coalition structure values. The reason for this
is that in AOH each agent has to use as few resources as
possible when it is selected to join a coalition, and thus
AOH needs to select many alternative members to satisfy the
corresponding task. On the contrary, in TOH each agent is
expected to do its utmost to contribute its residual resources
to a coalition. Accordingly, with the increase of r, a coalition
obtained by AOH will contain more members, which results
in a lot of extra commutation cost and thus a sharp decrease
of the coalition structure value.
On the whole, the reliability and effectiveness of the AOH
and TOH are validated from the empirical results on the basis
of different numbers of agents, tasks, and resources in both the
relaxed and the tight environments. We find that the coalition
structure value in OCF is closely related to the numbers of
agents and tasks, but has little relation with the number of
resources.
The proposed TOH is feasible and efficient no matter
how n, m, and r change, which justifies the utility of TOH
in practice, especially in large-scale domains. Specifically,
when the number of agents or resources is big, TOH is far
more effective than AOH no matter whether on the coalition
structure value or on the time consumption. This indicates that
TOH can support stronger heuristic information to guide the
evolution of the MHAs. On the contrary, AOH is sensitive
to n and r. When there are too many agents or resources,
the performance of the AOH will decrease much. Yet, one
bright spot for AOH is that it was affected insignificantly
by the growing numbers of tasks. Accordingly, AOH may be
serviceable in special scenarios where there are a large number
of tasks but few agents and resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
Coalition structure generation is one of the most important
challenging problems in multi-agent systems [6]. Apart from
the traditional non-overlapping coalition formation, very little
work exists on generation of overlapping coalitions. This is
because the search space of overlapping coalitions is far larger
than that of non-overlapping coalitions [20]. In this paper,
we discussed OCF in resource-constrained and subadditive
task oriented domains and examined the complexity of the
overlapping coalition structure generation (OCSG) problem.
After that, to uncover the overlapping coalition structure, we
proposed a generic task-oriented heuristic (called TOH) which
can be imbedded in binary meta-heuristic algorithms. Through
extensive comparative experiments on the basis of GA, BPSO,
and BDE in the relaxed, tight, and harsh environments with
varied numbers of agents, tasks, and resources, respectively,
the proposed TOH is shown to be promising in solving the
OCSG problem.
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Fig. 6. The average time consumption (in seconds) of the TOH and AOH with different numbers of agents.
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Fig. 7. The average coalition structure values obtained by TOH and AOH with different numbers of agents.
However, although TOH based GA, BPSO, and BDE return
high-value overlapping coalitions quickly, they do not provide
any guarantee on finding the optimal. This leads two main
avenues in our future work. On one hand, there is a need to
verify whether the proposed TOH is able to help GA, BPSO,
and BDE establish a bound from the optimal. This can borrow
the analytical method in [32] to show the approximation
performance of TOH based GA, BPSO, and BDE in terms
of how close the overlapping coalition structure obtained is
to the optimal. On the other hand, perhaps one of the most
promising directions is to combine the proposed TOH with
the state-of-the-art dynamic programming algorithm for non-
overlapping coalition structure generation which guarantees to
find the optimal in O(3n) time [6].
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Fig. 8. The average time consumption (in seconds) of the TOH and AOH with different numbers of tasks.
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Fig. 9. The average coalition structure values obtained by TOH and AOH with different numbers of tasks.
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